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The illegal appropriation of the Free Territory of Trieste

“First Part of Three”

“Behind the secret scenes of the Treaty of Osimo 1975”

The legal analysis of the Treaty of Osimo is divided into 3 parts:

- Part One: "Behind the secret scenes of the Treaty of Osimo 1975"
- Part Two: "Analysis of the Treaty of Osimo from 1975"
- Part Three: "Analysis of the Economic Agreement of Osimo, 1975"

Introduction:


As already analysed in the article «The Obscuring of the International Nation of Trieste», the Committee FPT does not consider as valid the Memorandum of London (MoU), signed on October 5th 1954. As a consequence, the Osimo Agreements, dated November 10th 1975 and essentially based on the said MoU, are considered as the final step towards the illegal appropriation of the Free Territory of Trieste.

We report hereunder the interview dated 15/11/2010 to Boris Šnuderl, the then secret mediator for the Yugoslavian / Slovenian side, in order to publicly explain this “FRAUD TREATY” signed between the two nations bordering with the Free Territory of Trieste without consulting the original citizens of this nation, and without obtaining the authorization of the UN Security Council, the sole organization responsible for the integrity of the territory.

The Committee FPT does not comment on the interview, so as to allow readers to remark its contradictions.

The original Slovenian text is taken from:

<http://www.dnevnik.si/objektiv/intervjuji/1042402715>



BORIS ŠNUDERL

Interview, Monday 15/11/2010, text Viljenka Škorjanec

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After the failure of diplomatic talks aimed at solving once and for all the problem of borders with Italy, the parties opted for the Italian proposal to start special and secret negotiations led by political delegates chosen from outside the institutions of the two countries. The result was the Osimo Agreements. On the 35th anniversary of the signature of the agreements, the then secret mediator for the Yugoslavian / Slovenian side Boris Šnuderl was interviewed.

After the Second World War for several decades relations between Italy and Yugoslavia were worsened by disputes concerning the definitive setting of the State border and the protection of the Slovenian minority in the zone A of the Free Territory of Trieste, based on the Special Statute annexed to the London Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of 1954. Diplomatic efforts aimed at solving the open questions did not succeed because of the lack of political will in Rome. However, economic cooperation was constantly encouraged by the Italian Republic, which was the main economic partner among the Western European countries.

Italy also supported interests for Yugoslavian exports in the countries of the European Economic Community (EEC), granting many loans to the Yugoslavian State and supporting the industrial cooperation by means of a mixed Commission, which for many years was run by Boris Šnuderl for Yugoslavia and by Eugenio Carbone for Italy.

Šnuderl was included in the mediation process for the definitive setting of the State border with Italy in November 1972, at first in the preliminary stage as a member of the federal executive Council in the Government of Đemal Bijedić, responsible for the relationships with the European Economic Community, EFTA and OECD. From July 1974, he was delegate for Slovenia in the Chamber of Republics and autonomous regions of the Federal Assembly of Yugoslavia, president of the Committee for economic relations and vice-president of the Economic Chamber of Yugoslavia. In the meantime, acting as a special political delegate, he ran the secret talks with his Italian partner Eugenio Carbone, director general of the Italian Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Small Business.

After several multi-year and unsuccessful diplomatic talks, the Italian partner suggested starting a special kind of secret negotiation outside institutions called “second channel”, which excluded governments and their ministries for foreign affairs. Most of the talks took place at the Strmol castle and in 1975 also in Dubrovnik and Strunjan. Documents were officially initialled in August 1975 in Belgrade and on November 10th 1975 Agreements were signed in “Monte San Pietro di Osimo” (thereafter known as “Osimo Agreements”) near Ancona.

This kind of negotiation may be used for solving complicated interstate relationships, when the traditional diplomatic way is impossible, or prevented by the internal situation.

This year the 35th anniversary of the Osimo Treaty is celebrated. These Agreements represent one of the main successes of the Yugoslavian foreign policy and after the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia they were recognized and transferred to the new Republic of Slovenia by the Italian Republic. Such treaties and their annexes are binding bilateral agreements and the whole of the relations between Slovenia and Italy is based on them.

As regards the definitive solution of the issue concerning the border between Yugoslavia and Italy, an important step for the relationships between the two countries is represented by the meeting between their respective Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Miloš Minić and Giuseppe Medici, in March 1973 in Dubrovnik. How was evaluated this meeting in consideration of the birth of this “second channel” and on which occasion, according to official diplomatic talks, was reached this initiative?

As regards Dubrovnik meeting, Italy tested the Yugoslavian position on the possible application of talks led by special mediators. The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs Medici,

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who personally signed the letter confirming the appointment of Carboni, a few days after Dubrovnik meeting did not take the initiative of organizing a meeting for discussing this possibility, and left the choice to the Yugoslavian Minister for Foreign Affairs Minić. It was then revealed that Medici was just following, although unwillingly, the guidelines of his Party, "Democrazia Cristiana" (Christian Democracy), which was also responsible for the deferment of the so called "second channel". The start of the "second channel" was agreed by Minić and Medici in private after the official meeting. Medici insisted on trying a second diplomatic mediation effort, and in case of failure the "second channel" would have been started. Today we know that Medici was following the guidelines coming from the top of Democrazia Cristiana, as he did not inform his own Ministry and he never asked Minić, not even towards the end of his office, to start a parallel negotiation, which was also his original idea.

The actual possibility was suggested to us by Carbone. The top of the party considered that failure to solve the border dispute could worsen Italian global politics and particularly the foreign and defence policy; therefore, also due to international pressures, mainly from the United States, a solution was to be prepared.

Why, in your opinion, Italy initiated these negotiations?

Thanks to the Cold War and the support of the United States, Italy reached a rapid economic development and with a wider support of the West, Democrazia Cristiana conservative governments could oppose left forces, which at that time were quite strong, more effectively. Italian policy towards Yugoslavia was described, in consideration of the division of NATO southern wing, as an opposition of the socialist ideology and as an extreme defence from Yugoslavia territorial tendencies.

According to the London Memorandum of 1954, the definitive solution of the border dispute with Yugoslavia could not be solved until the diplomatic talks, which towards the end of 1973 were completely blocked.

Reasons for this failure are linked to the opposition of the political parties, to the influence of the bordering provinces, organizations of exiles, different associations, and also to the state administrations, above all diplomatic and military circles. Breaking that stalemate and starting new constructive talks meant above all losing zone B of the Free Territory of Trieste and publicly reopening old wounds related to the military defeat of the Second World War.

These circumstances led to a series of preliminary works and in particular to the urgent need of a secret negotiation. The reached agreement would have been therefore announced to authorities and Italian opinion sensationally, describing this more than two decades long fight as a sign of loyalty and patriotism, as an inevitable step due to the strong pressures coming from the international community and the allies, in order to get to the final settlement of such borders. Relationships between world powers, the soviet intervention in the countries of the Warsaw Treaty in Europe, the advanced age of President Tito, synonym of the Yugoslavian stability, could lead at any time to unexpected events. Italian politics strategists were seriously concerned by this state of things.

They thought it was high time to accept reality and prevent any risk of crisis and disorders on such a complicated matter as state borders. Many years later Giuseppe Medici, Giulio Andreotti, Emilio Colombo, Amintore Fanfani, Mariano Rumor and other politicians told me that they had to break through many reserves in their group, that the sole way out was represented by secret negotiations and that Democrazia Cristiana supported Carbone throughout talks, especially during critical stages when he personally coordinated the different points of view with the leaders of other parties. It is interesting to observe that Carbone was a member of the influential and notorious Masonic lodge P2, which was said to be in harness with the American

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secret services. For this reason Carbone had serious problems subsequently.

What was the Yugoslavian position towards the Italian initiative?

The Yugoslavian position was extremely cautious. We knew that in Rome there were many political difficulties, many contrasts within the state apparatus, therefore we understood that the function of this “second channel” could succeed only in case of a decision coming from the authorities in Rome. I was unofficially informed about this position by Carbone himself during one of the meetings. We also suspected that it could be a manipulation of which he was not aware. We always bore in mind the events of that century, when the Italian diplomacy and Rome political ability rendered great services to Italy. We based our decisions on more exhaustive international reports, according to which actual conditions in Rome were to be taken into account. For this reason we decided to accept the “second channel” solution, whose term was limited to thirty working days. In case of an Italian provocation, we would have had an additional argument for presenting a declaration at the next Helsinki Conference on security and cooperation in Europe. Together with Minister Minić we committed ourselves to presenting the proposal of accession to the Belgrade summit, in case of an Italian manipulation. I was subsequently reproached by my superiors for my political naiveté.

Our deep pessimism is confirmed by the attitude of some experts of the team, who considered the results of some documents already initialled in Strunjan in 1975 as an Italian manipulation. A decision on the honesty of Italian intentions, realizing we had nothing to lose by setting a precise deadline on the term of negotiations, was also supported by Edvard Kardelj, Sergej Krajgher and Vladimir Bakarić.

You had been in Belgrade since 1963, and you were a delegated mediator for the Slovenian side. During a private meeting in July 2001 Minić told me that Italy suggested this kind of negotiation through your mediation. What was the actual role of Slovenia during talks?

Negotiations were attended by many Slovenian officers and experts, for single sectors and in particular for the economic sector, for the sectors of minorities, border issues and also operating procedure during meetings at Strmol castle. The Slovenian authorities were constantly informed and took part in the activity of the two mediators, and subsequently they had an increased group of experts. Croatian political authorities were contacted by Minić.

In the spring of 1974, when activities restarted (the second channel) you told Carboni, that you would have accepted such role only upon its prior confirmation and approval both at federal and republican level by Slovenia and Croatia. You worked as a special delegate in direct contact with Minić and the leading decision makers of the country. You wanted to terminate your office with a political agreement, while the whole of the technical diplomatic work (translations, texts) would have been put for the execution in the hands of diplomatic corps. However, the delegation of August 1975 brings out that your delegation was extended also to diplomatic talks, until the signature of the Osimo Treaty. Why?

Minić wanted to prevent possible conspiracies and disagreements in the drafting of diplomatic texts for the signature of documents, so he accepted the Italian proposal to keep Carbone as diplomatic mediator. For this reason he asked me to continue my job as a diplomatic mediator.

Why was it necessary to adopt the secret talks strategy excluding the ministries for foreign affairs?

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Mediators had to be chosen outside the circles of ministries for foreign affairs because they had not to be overburden with issues concerning diplomatic relationships and multi-year strategies of Italian state officials. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs had only to provide technical aids and experts, who in the interest of the State would have had to maintain the strictest confidentiality and comply with the orders of the two mediators. Ambassadors in Rome and Belgrade were not informed on the negotiation, in order to avoid the influence of politicians and mass media. In both countries only some leading decision makers and the country's highest authorities, in other words governments, were informed. The Italian ambassador in Belgrade, Walter Maccotta, told me afterwards that he was informed on what was happening throughout the talks. Almost the same for ambassadors Roberto Ducci and Folco Tabalzo, which however does not correspond to the declarations made by the secretary general of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs Eugenio Plaia during the meeting of Udine in 1989. I think that Italian diplomats have tried to reduce their personal and professional embarrassment with respect to the development of negotiation talks which excluded the ministries for foreign affairs.

How did you and Carboni succeed in keeping the talks secret?

As regards phone conversations, we used some code words. Perhaps by force of habit I used some of them also in writing. This conspiracy method succeeded perfectly, also thanks to the secretary of the Executive Council Franjo Turk – Gorazd, who organized everything with the support of state bodies.

We managed to keep talks secret even later, when the experts' panel was enlarged and visits from Italy and work to be carried out in loco increased. I had some difficulties in justifying my absences from Belgrade, where I held two offices at the same time (vice president of the Economic Chamber of Yugoslavia and president of the committee for international relations of the Federal Assembly Ed. Note). So I often landed at Brnik airport at night and on the following morning I came back to Belgrade. By inventing different explanations I managed to justify my absences without arousing suspicion.

Which were the most complicated matters which were negotiated with Italy?

I had a copy of Minić dossier and guidelines for negotiations with Italy, and also some documentation of Slovenia and Croatia. Since 1947 I had been working in the field of commercial relations with Italy, which made my task easier. All matters were complicated. During preliminary meetings we analysed with Carbone the whole of documentation and we drew up the following agreement plan:

- firstly, confirming the boundaries of sectors of formal zone B and A of the Free Territory of Trieste, which would have become, by common consent, the state border between the two countries;
- resolving anomalies in the North and central sectors. The North sector included Sabotino, Collio and Kolovrat, while the central sector included the area of Gorizia Karst (boundaries according to the Peace Treaty), always respecting functionality and citizens' interests;
- as to the South border (between zone A and B up to the sea Ed. Note) there was much to do, in particular with respect to indemnification and citizenship, as the Italian party had a long list of requests made by parties and institutions;
- allowing navigation of its tankers in the territorial waters from Salvore to Trieste;





- completing the idea of an industrial zone. Rome wanted to stress its interest in solving Trieste territorial problems;

- for Italy the establishment of an industrial zone was the condition to reach an agreement: thanks to this essential condition Trieste economy would have benefited from industrial development. Such industrial zone had to be established primarily in zone B of the Free Territory of Trieste, mainly for political reasons. With the establishment of the industrial area, the agreement would have been seen as a success, for this reason a list of economic projects was drawn up, which for us did not represent a major problem; among them: increasing border economy, water, energy, industry, agriculture, trade, border circulation of citizens, road connections. Secondly, increasing the importance of Adriatic ports as ports of call in competition with Northern Europe ports, such as Antwerp, Rotterdam, Hamburg. And thirdly, judging as reasonable the establishment of the ship canal Isonzo-Sava.

The idea of the ship canal had already been launched by the Italians within the group working on economic programs, as it represented the continuation of the project of building ship canals in France and Germany, so as not to waste the future chances of development of our countries. The idea also referred to the old Austrian project of building a navigation channel connecting Vienna to the Adriatic. A special commission would have been in charge of evaluating from the technical and financial points of view (but also all other relevant aspects) the feasibility of this huge project: connecting Sava and Danube.

The issue concerning indemnifications for nationalized property, the choice freedom of the two parties, problems of citizenship, and hence matters related to inheritances, degree and qualifications, plans in the event of natural disasters, ecological matters.

The most complicated issues were no doubt those related to the protection of the Slovenian minority in Italy. Rights of Slovenian people according to the special Statute annexed to the London Memorandum of 1954 were extended on our own initiative to the area outside zone A of the Free Territory of Trieste. We constantly spoke of former zone A of the Free Territory of Trieste which Italy had annexed, while the Italians insisted on their sovereignty over our zone B of the Free Territory of Trieste and on the fact that the border between the two zones was just a boundary line. Carbone did not want to hear of the decision set by the London Memorandum, not even of zone A, Gorizia and Udine. This question was the main problem of the whole negotiation and once I run the risk of bringing everything down, because, without a decision concerning minorities, talks could not be concluded. Our determination extended the talks by some months. Technical problems were not complicated. Strmol castle was at our disposition and we could count on the full logistic support of Slovenian protocol services.

Why did the Yugoslavian side temporize on the final decision concerning the start of the talks?

The Yugoslavian side had always responded to all Italian initiatives. In 1974, due to a suspicion on the honesty of Italian intentions, Yugoslavian political authorities wanted to reach a final decision within a couple of weeks, but in the meantime preliminary steps for agreements were already underway. We can speak of an actual postponement only between the first and second visit of Carbone and his experts to the Strmol castle. Towards the end of July, within the space of seven – ten days, Minić consulted the political authorities and some of his closest collaborators after the departure of the Italian group from Strmol. His deputy Lazar Mojsov had always been in favour of negotiation talks led by special delegates. He also met a group of experts who worked with me. The vice secretary Novak Pribičević was appointed as coordinator of contacts with services of the Federal Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior. The responsible for legal services Mr. Aleksandar Jelić, the advisor of the federal secretary

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Ratko Močivnik and the head of the section for Italy Veselin Pupovac also worked as experts under my direction at the Strmol Castle.

During the meetings the first problem which arose was the one related to the dilemma whether the Italians were temporizing or had serious intentions. The prevailing opinion was that at the end of mediations, it would have been possible to verify the honesty of their intentions. Otherwise the Yugoslavian side would have presented its availability to the talks as one of the elements in support of the internalization of the problem, also in view of the approaching Helsinki Conference on security and cooperation in Europe. Kardelj in a letter dated September 15th 1974 asked for the support in the decision relating to the start of talks, and for the permission to support Minić, who was harmonizing official State positions and wanted to protect himself in case of failure and possible accusations of “political naiveté”.

I think that the definitive decision taken by Yugoslavian political authorities, as regards the agreement on the start of talks, was positively influenced by Kardelj’s support. Only some days after my report to Kardelj, Minić told me that Carbone could come back to Strmol and that the mediation could be started. Initially he conferred me a general delegation, which was too extended and I decided to reject, as I feared that the Italians would have extended the list of open questions. Unfortunately it was lost. We prepared with Minić a new delegation, defining my power and imposing some limitations on the possible agreement. The Italians interpreted this delegation as our approval to the start of talks. For precautionary reasons, throughout the talks I photocopied some documents. In Strmol, Dubrovnik and Strunjan I photographed both groups in order to prevent the Italians from denying their presence. Doubts on the success of talks and on the ratification of procedures continued all the time, even after the signature of Osimo Agreements and until the definitive conclusion of the procedure in Parliament in 1977.

What was the role of the then Minister for Foreign Affairs Aldo Moro with respect to the start of talks?

Minister Moro was not in favour of the “second channel”, but he was no doubt informed of its existence. Like Medici, Moro had another political position and at the same time he was influenced by the circles of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. He thought that diplomacy could obtain even more and that there was no hurry to reach an agreement. The delegation to Carboni was signed after the decisive intervention of the Prime Minister, of which I was personally informed by Andreotti in 1986 in Paris. Even though most of talks had already been carried out, in New York Moro objected to the validity of such a negotiation. Minić persuading argument had a decisive influence also on his subsequent behaviour. In Italy Moro was the author of the agreement with the left, which led to the accession of the Italian Communist Party to the Government; for this reason he had many enemies, both in Italy and abroad, mainly in the United States. The political price for solving the problem with Yugoslavia would have certainly obstructed him, as his political adversaries would have taken advantage of the situation, by reproaching his weakness towards the socialist bloc and this would have obstructed the realization of the historic compromise, which unfortunately cost him his life.

How was reached the agreement on minorities in Strmol?

The point concerning minorities in the process of mediation for setting definitive borders between the two countries was strongly rejected by the Italians, who claimed that we were discussing problems concerning borders and not minorities.

As I was aware of the importance of the industrial zone for the Italians, because with its establishment they hoped to calm down the bordering Trieste area, the main opponent to an agreement, I started to present the minority issue as an essential condition for the solution of the border problem. The Italians were ready to accept a preamble and to promise the approval

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of a solemn declaration in Parliament, but they firmly rejected the idea of including an article concerning the minority in the agreement.

In Strmol talks were suspended due to disagreements on the minority point. Our partner went back to Rome, where the leading figures of the major Italian political parties were consulted. It got the permission to harmonize a part of the text of this article with the help of international law experts, and then it came back to Strmol. We, the two mediators, harmonized the article text, but afterwards, in March 1975 in Dubrovnik, the Italians asked for a reduction of its content. We rejected their request, and they offered the possibility of moving a part of such content in the preamble. In March 1975 in Dubrovnik the Italians did not make any more objections to territorial issues and also in the opinion of the State's highest authorities the introduction of a point concerning the minority, even if with a reduced content together with the preamble, was the maximum which could be obtained in the final agreement.

Throughout Osimo talks the Yugoslavian direction never ceased to demand the solution of the minority problem.

How is it possible that talks concerning the definition of maritime borders took only two days?

Defining maritime borders was one of the simplest problems.

Italy did not set any condition on the solution of this problem. On November 16th and 17th intense talks, attended by prominent authorities of both sides, took place in Strmol. The Italians asked for moving the sea border a bit closer to the Yugoslavian coast, so as to allow big tanks to get to the port of Trieste (for the greater depth of the sea near the Yugoslavian coast Ed. Note). Our requests were based on the points of the international convention. In November talks a final agreement was reached, and the borders were not set according to Italian requests, but providing the Italians with those concessions necessary for a normal traffic of Italian ships up to the port of Trieste. During talks it was also established that Italian military ships could sail in the internal part of the island of Palagruža also by convoys of NATO military marine.

Why for the signing the agreement did the Yugoslavia delegation fly using a military plane JAK 40, of too small dimensions?

It was almost impossible to get a bigger military plane for that date. Minić insisted that the delegation had to fly on board of a State plane. For this reason the number of journalists wishing to assist to the signature of the agreement could not be higher. I offered to Minić to use a DC9 of Slovenia Inex Adria airline, which Director Jane Nedok made available to me free of charge.

Besides its length, with a stopover at Split for refuelling, the flight was complicated by Italian weather conditions, and instead of landing in Ancona, we arrived at the Rimini military airport. The delegation travelled by car up to Osimo, and our plane arrived after us. At the departure, technicians noticed that they could not switch on our plane, because of different aggregate systems (Western European countries used a system incompatible with the soviet one Ed. Note). Difficulties arose when, due to the lack of fuel, it was not possible to switch on the plane twice. Due to these problems, the Italian Minister Rumor offered us to use its own DC 9 of Alitalia airlines, used by the Italian delegation to get to Rome and which would have brought the Yugoslavian delegation back to Belgrade. Later, with great commitment and huge efforts, our crew was able to switch on by using the accumulator with which the plane was equipped. Minister Minić offered his thanks to his Italian counterpart Rumor for his aid. This problem should not have occurred and could have been avoided by flying with the DC9 at my disposal.

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As regards the subsequent implementation of Osimo Agreements, in the period between 1978 and 1982, you were, at federal level, president of the Commission for implementing the Osimo Agreements working at the federal executive Council. In the meantime, also at federal level, you were president of the commission for the building of the ship canal Isonzo-Sava. How did you continue your relationships with Carbone?

As regards the implementation of Osimo Agreements, Carbone was, for the Italian side, the president of the Commission for the building of the ship canal Isonzo-Sava. This was a project worth 10-12 million dollars, which, due to its huge costs, was cancelled by both the Austrian and the Italian governments. Slovenia continued to carry out global planning studies concerning rivers Ljubljanica and Sava and related to the building of hydroelectric power stations on Sava. The ship canal idea vanished, with the result that now hydroelectric power stations have been built on Sava, without a navigation project, which at the beginning was the main topic of studies. Cooperation in the realization of energy projects did not give the expected results and at the same time Slovenia was not sufficiently interested in extending the waterway up to the Slovenian coast. Minor economic questions, such as the building of water collectors for Trieste waterworks supplying, were solved at local level.

For each country an ambassador of the respective Ministries for Foreign Affairs was charged with the task of monitoring the implementation of Osimo Agreements. In Slovenia at the republican level the president of the Commission for implementing the Osimo Agreements was Tone Poljšak. When I acted as Yugoslavian ambassador in Paris in the period 1984-1988, I had several informal meetings with Andreotti. We talked about possible highway connections, proposed by the Italians already during preliminary works of the Treaty of Osimo. Andreotti, as Italian Prime Minister, and Dušan Šinigoj, as president of the Slovenian executive council, had met in 1988 in Fiume, where Andreotti proposed to Slovenia the common building of highway connections westwards. The Italian government would have financed part of the projects by granting favourable loans. Common studies were carried over till 1992, but the new Slovenian government gave up the idea of realizing a common concept of the highway connections project. According to the calculations of the then Minister of Transport Marjan Kranjc the proposed plan was much more expensive than the current project of highway building in Slovenia. In the new government of Janez Drnovšek, Kranjc was not reelected as Minister for Transport. Andreotti withdrawal, the weakening of Democrazia Cristiana, changes in political life and the so called "mani pulite", led to the definitive decline of these initiatives. We think we lost the right moment when the Italians were still able to support such projects.

Carbone visited me in Ljubljana some days before his death and he informed me of a debate on his book entitled "L'Italia e gli accordi di Osimo" ("Italy and Osimo Agreements"), which he was writing and which would have been published in Milan. He wanted me to write my notes, which would have been published as another point of view, or my disagreements, it is a pity...

May Slovenia use a similar kind of talks for solving its problems with Croatia?

This experience reveals the need of always taking into account times and conditions allowing such kind of moves also in very difficult circumstances. However, these moves cannot succeed without a firm bilateral willingness. Expert politicians and also diplomats can always rely on some unofficial and secret contacts (both "ad hoc" and permanent relations) in case of difficulty and crises.

The complicated nature of the dispute on borders with Yugoslavia clearly emerges from the fact that Italy put off the solution for twenty years and also from the absence of diplomatic strategies like the "second channel". The example of "second channel" should have been immediately used by Minić successor, Lazar Mojsov, for solving the problems between Greece

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and the Republic of Macedonia. I think that in 1992 and 1993 in relationships with Croatia we had the occasion to adopt a similar kind of agreement, also in consideration of open questions (Croats communicated in a similar manner with the Serbian President Slobodan Milošević Ed. Note). When President Franjo Tuđman asked for the setting of borders for Prevlaka according to borders of cadastral municipalities, we could have asked the same for Salvo: making some concessions and drafting a framework for the solution of the problem.

I also had an idea of the most suitable person to negotiate with Croatia. Considering the conditions of that time, president Tuđman was likely to succeed in persuading the Croatian Parliament to approve the proposal of the Piran Gulf.

Even after my proposal to warn the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which I made to people responsible for talks with Croatia, I did not have any feedback.

Not even Croatian proposals during the 1993/94 war for a bilateral negotiation on the Piran Gulf were accepted by RS with the motivation that you cannot buy something you already possess.

In my opinion a real occasion to solve the question of the sea border with Croatia has been lost.

How do you consider, from the historical point of view, the current situation and the future of relationships between Slovenia and Italy?

With the Osimo Agreements interstate relationships have been sanctioned, nevertheless after the recognition of Slovenia in 1992, the Italians have tried to agree on an amendment, in other words to evidence that some parts of the agreement are obsolete and should be updated. In the meantime a coordination project with a showdown has been started for evaluating how much the minority problem influenced the solution of economic issues in this area. "Banca di credito Triestino" and "Banca di Gorizia" are a clear example. It is evident that the exploitation of inter-Slovenian political relationships in Trieste is aimed at weakening the Slovenian influence on Friuli Venezia Giulia, also in the economic field. The Slovenian Government policy has not taken into account our minority in Italy, by accusing the organization SAFTI, by distancing itself from the bankruptcy of "Banca di Credito di Trieste", thus paving the way for an anti-Slovenian offensive which has caused huge problems to Slovenian people. Some years ago, in the DELO newspaper, Marko Kosin expressed some criticisms and declared that such attitude is penalizing Slovenian people more than twenty years of Fascism.

After Osimo Agreements, questions related to indemnifications have remained unsolved, as Italy has yet to take into considerations indemnifications for the financial resources of Luxembourg exiles. This makes us think that they want to create "reservations" for some future questions linked to exiles. In Friuli Venezia Giulia, and partially at national level, oppositions against the Republic of Slovenia and Republic of Croatia have developed. The establishment of the February 10th as "National Memorial Day of Foibe" makes us think that Italy has yet to heal old wounds connected to the loss of a part of the territory and that such wounds will remain open for a long time.

Osimo talks took place outside state structures, by means of political delegates of the two involved parties, which is quite rare. Secret talks are usually carried out by State authorities. From the diplomatic point of view talks adopted with Italy should be considered also in future as an example of agreement and this draws attention to the need of taking into account questions that Italy already raised on that occasion.

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